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“THE WRONG APPROACH AT THE WRONG TIME?”:
MAINE ADOPTS STRICT LIABILITY FOR
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES IN DYER
V. MAINE DRILLING AND BLASTING, INC.
Matthew Cobb*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, held in
Dyer v. Maine Drilling and Blasting, Inc.1 that strict liability should be applied to
abnormally dangerous activities in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 519-20.2 In doing so, the court expressly overruled its decision in
Reynolds v. W.H. Hinman Co.,3 which had rejected a strict liability approach to
blasting cases in favor of a negligence-based standard.4
In Dyer, a majority of the Law Court vacated the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment for Maine Drilling and Blasting, Inc. (Maine Drilling)5 and
held that strict liability should be applied in cases that involve abnormally
dangerous activities.6 The majority explained that policy approaches regarding
strict liability had shifted in the more than fifty years since the court’s decision in
Reynolds and that almost every other state now applied strict liability in abnormally
dangerous activity cases.7 Furthermore, the majority maintained that because the
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law. I would like to thank Professors
Melvyn Zarr and Jennifer Wriggins for their invaluable observations and advice on this project and
many others.
1. 2009 ME 126, 984 A.2d 210.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977). §§ 519-20 provide, in relevant part:
§519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

§ 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
145 Me. 343, 75 A.2d 802 (1950).
Id. at 361, 75 A.2d at 811.
Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 37, 984 A.2d at 220.
Id. ¶ 18, 984 A.2d at 216.
Id.
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legal basis upon which Reynolds was decided had “fallen into jurisprudential
disrepute . . . [the court] must allow that rule to change.”8 The dissents, however,
contended that there was no need to adopt a strict liability standard because it was
very likely the Dyers could recover damages by showing causation under
Reynolds’s negligence standard9 and, therefore, principles of stare decisis weighed
against needlessly overturning viable precedent.10
Although “blasting [is regarded] as a paradigm of the abnormally dangerous
activities category” under the theory of strict liability,11 the dissents were correct
that there was no need to overturn Reynolds because it was very likely that the
Dyers could have recovered under the negligence standard established by that
decision. Moreover, as many courts and commentators have argued, strict liability
should only be applied in an abnormally dangerous activities case when the
plaintiff has demonstrated that proving negligence would be impossible.12
Part II of this Note will examine the Law Court’s prior opinions in blasting
cases and Part III will analyze the Dyer decision. Part IV will then demonstrate
that the dissents properly brought into question the rationales the majority utilized
as justifications for imposing strict liability. Part IV will also examine how section
520 should be applied in future cases and will argue that whether strict liability
should be imposed on a given activity is a decision best left to the discretion of the
Legislature. This Note will conclude by maintaining that the scope of common law
strict liability in Maine should remain limited.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF BLASTING CASES IN MAINE
In the 1950 case of Reynolds, the Law Court declined to impose strict liability
on blasting activities in favor of a negligence-based standard of care.13 In that case,
the plaintiffs alleged that their home had been damaged by seismic vibrations from
W.H. Hinman’s blasting operations during a public construction project along
Route 1 in Bath, Maine.14 The court found that it was unnecessary to adopt strict
liability “in order to do justice to a plaintiff” because if “proper emphasis is laid on
the test of due care according to the circumstances, then the theory of negligence
will generally be sufficient” to allow the plaintiff to recover for injuries incurred
from blasting.15 The court also noted that there were “no unanimously approved
rules or criteria” that could be employed to distinguish between dangers that
require ordinary care and those that are deemed extra hazardous.16 Even so, the
court reasoned that juries, when presented with the question, would usually find
that the degree of care “will increase in proportion to the danger to be apprehended
8. Id. ¶ 28, 984 A.2d at 218 (citations omitted).
9. Id. ¶ 41, 984 A.2d at 221 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
10. Id. ¶¶ 45-47, 984 A.2d at 222.
11. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and Traditional Strict Liability:
Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1355, 1364 (2009).
12. See Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence
Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 631-40 (1999).
13. Reynolds, 145 Me. at 361, 75 A.2d at 811.
14. Id. at 343, 75 A.2d at 802-03.
15. Id. at 351, 75 A.2d at 806 (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 349, 75 A.2d at 805 (citations omitted).
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in case of neglect,” and that accordingly “the amount of care required of a blaster”
will be very high. 17 Five years later, the Law Court applied this negligence
standard in two blasting cases: Albison v. Robbins and White, Inc.18 and Cratty v.
Samuel Aceto and Co.19
In Albison, a group of homeowners claimed that their properties had been
damaged by the defendant’s blasting of ledge for a sewage tunnel as part of a
general contract with the city of Waterville.20 The homeowners alleged that
Robbins and White’s superintendent had been informed that vibrations from the
blasts were causing severe damage to their property and that he had responded by
stating he was using the smallest charges of dynamite possible, even though he
never attempted to determine if he could remove the ledge effectively with a lesser
charge.21 Thereafter, he continued to use the same methods and the same amount
of dynamite as before, causing further damage to the homeowners’ properties.22
The court, citing its decision in Reynolds, explained that “ordinary care depends on
the circumstances of each particular case. Where the risk is great a person must be
especially cautious.”23 Accordingly, the court found that the “defendant was
indifferent to probable consequences, which is the highest form of negligence” and
that “a slower method with more moderate charges of the explosive, would (if it
had been tried) have caused little or no damage.”24 The court reaffirmed that
“[t]here is no absolute liability for damage by blasting. There is liability for
damage which takes place from blasting carried on in a negligent manner.” Two
days later, the court further developed this negligence standard with its decision in
Cratty.
Similar to the facts in Albison, the plaintiff in Cratty claimed that his home’s
foundation had been cracked by shockwaves from the defendant’s blasting, which
had taken place within 200 feet of his house, in connection with the laying of a
sewer line for the Waterville Sewage District.25 However, unlike in Albison, Cratty
could not establish either the amount of dynamite being used or the methods
employed by Samuel Aceto and Co., or that the blasters had any knowledge of the
property damage they had allegedly caused.26 Despite this lack of evidence, the
Law Court found that to establish negligence in a blasting case “[i]t may not be
necessary for a plaintiff to show . . . evidence as to the amount of explosive being
used or the method or manner of its use” and that negligence may be proven “by
any evidence that is relevant and material, although it may be circumstantial.”27
The court further explained that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be employed
by a plaintiff in situations “where the circumstances are, as here, most uncommon,
unusual, unexpected and extraordinary, and the damage is such that it would not
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 351, 75 A.2d at 806 (citation omitted).
151 Me. 114, 116 A.2d 608 (1955).
151 Me. 126, 116 A.2d 623 (1955).
Albison, 151 Me. at 117, 116 A.2d at 610.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 122, 116 A.2d at 612.
Id. at 125, 116 A.2d at 613.
Cratty, 151 Me. at 126, 116 A.2d at 624-25.
Id. at 128, 116 A.2d at 625.
Id. at 131, 116 A.2d at 626 (internal quotations omitted).
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ordinarily have occurred if the user of the dangerous instrumentality had the
required knowledge, and proper care had been exercised in its use.”28
The court, in crafting its opinion, maintained that it is “rare that damage is
caused to adjoining property[] if the blaster uses the reasonable care that the law
requires that he should use. This is common knowledge to every school boy and to
every adult citizen.”29 This negligence-based approach, established in Reynolds
and expanded upon in Albison and Cratty, remained firmly fixed in Maine law over
the next fifty years and was still being applied as recently as the 2007 case of
Maravell v. R.J. Grondin and Sons.30
In Maravell, the plaintiff claimed that she had sustained hearing damage from
blasts conducted as close as eighty-five feet from her office during the construction
of a shopping mall.31 She contended that Grondin, the general contractor, had
“negligently failed to exercise reasonable care in ‘implementing, contracting for,
and overseeing’ the blasting.”32 The Law Court, citing Albison and Cratty, noted
that “the standard of care of a blasting contractor may lie within common
knowledge,”33 but went on to explain that because “a layperson could not say
precisely what provisions a general contractor is required to make for the taking of
precautions[,] [e]xpert testimony is, therefore, necessary to establish the duty of a
general contractor.”34
A report produced by Maravell’s expert witness concluded that the
subcontractor could have better controlled the ground vibrations, air blasts, and
noise from the blasting “by, among other things, decreasing the hole depth and
diameter; reducing the number of holes per blast and pounds per delay; providing
ear protection; and constructing artificial noise barriers.”35 The court concluded
that a “fact-finder could reasonably infer that Grondin was required to exercise
reasonable care to ensure” that the subcontractor took the precautions mentioned in
the report.36
The court also dealt with the issue of whether W/S Biddeford Properties, LLC
could be held liable as the owner of the property upon which the blasting took
place.37 After explaining that a landowner can be held liable for the activity of a
third party that takes place on the landowner’s property if they are aware that the
activity will cause harm and the landowner fails to exercise reasonable care to
prevent the injury,38 the court found:
Here blasting, an inherently dangerous activity, was being conducted within
eighty-five feet of Maravell’s office, apparently with no sight, sound, or blast
28. Id. at 133, 116 A.2d at 627.
29. Id. at 131, 116 A.2d at 627.
30. 2007 ME 1, 914 A.2d 709.
31. Id. ¶ 2, 914 A.2d at 711.
32. Id. ¶ 3, 914 A.2d at 711. Maravell also commenced actions against McGoldrick Brothers
Blasting Services, Inc, which was subsequently settled, and against the shopping mall’s property
owners, W/S Biddeford Properties, LLC, who were made parties to this appeal. Id.
33. Id. ¶ 12, 914 A.2d at 713.
34. Id.
35. Id. ¶ 13, 914 A.2d at 713.
36. Maravell, 2007 ME 1, ¶ 13, 914 A.2d at 711.
37. Id. ¶ 16, 914 A.2d at 714.
38. Id.
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barrier in between. Because W/S Biddeford’s knowledge of that risk may be
imputed, the only issue in dispute is whether the risk was unreasonable. The
record, as it presently stands, does not permit the court to conclude, as a matter of
law, that there is no dispute as to material fact that the risks of injury from blasting
eighty-five feet from Maravell’s office were not unreasonable. As there remain
disputes as to this material fact regarding W/S Biddeford’s liability, the summary
39
judgment in their favor must be vacated.

Despite the fact that the Law Court had consistently applied the negligence
standard to blasting cases for over fifty years, just three years after the Maravell
decision the court rejected that standard with its opinion in Dyer, overruling
Reynolds and its progeny in favor of a strict liability approach to abnormally
dangerous activities.40
III. THE DYER DECISION
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
Vera Dyer’s home in Prospect, Maine is thought to be over seventy-years-old
and has a cement floor and foundation.41 In the fall of 2004, Maine Drilling gave
Ms. Dyer notice that it would be blasting rock near her home as part of a
construction project in connection with the replacement of the Waldo-Hancock
County Bridge.42 Maine Drilling conducted a pre-blast survey of the Dyer home
and the surveyor noted concrete deterioration in one of the walls and cracking of
the concrete flooring.43 Ms. Dyer’s son, Richard Dyer, also documented the
condition of the home by videotape prior to the blasting.44 Subsequently, Maine
Drilling “conducted over 100 blasts between October 2004 and early August 2005.
The closest blast was approximately 100 feet from the Dyer home.”45 Although
Ms. Dyer was visiting Florida when most of the blasting took place, she was in the
home when two of the blasts were set off and she felt the entire house shake.46 In
the spring of 2005, after the blasting had begun, Ms. Dyer’s sons, Paul and
Richard, checked on the house and noticed several changes in the condition of the
home, including: a three inch drop in the center of the basement floor; new and
enlarged cracks in the foundation; and a sagging support beam that caused the first
floor to be noticeably unlevel.47 According to a seismograph placed adjacent to the
Dyer home, at least six of the blasts exceeded guidelines set by United States
Bureau of Mines (USBM), which are intended to create a “safe operating
39. Id. ¶ 17, 914 A.2d at 714.
40. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 15, 984 A.2d at 215.
41. Id. ¶ 3, 984 A.2d at 212.
42. Id. ¶ 4, 984 A.2d at 212-13. The Dyer family has already endured a great deal of hardship
related to the replacement of the Waldo-Hancock County Bridge: the restaurant that the family had
owned and operated for over fifty years along Route 1 in Prospect was seized by the Maine Department
of Transportation pursuant to that agency’s eminent domain powers and was subsequently demolished.
See Dyer v. Dep’t of Transp., 2008 ME 106, 951 A.2d 821.
43. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 5, 984 A.2d at 213.
44. Id.
45. Id. ¶ 6, 984 A.2d at 213.
46. Id.
47. Id. ¶ 7, 984 A.2d at 213.
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envelope” in order to minimize property damage from seismic vibrations.48 Mark
Peterson, an expert in ground engineering consulted by the Dyers, testified at a
deposition that blasts conducted within the “safe operating envelope” were unlikely
to cause damage to structures within a building, but also opined that if the building
was underlain with uncontrolled fill, as opposed to engineered fill,49 the home
could potentially have been damaged even if the blasts were within the established
guidelines.50
The Dyers filed a complaint against Maine Drilling that included causes of
action based on negligence and strict liability.51 Maine Drilling subsequently filed
a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.52 On the issue of
strict liability, the trial court observed that in several decisions “the Law Court has
expressly held that blasting activities do not expose the actor to strict liability” and
that even though the Dyers argue those rulings are obsolete, “that caselaw remains
binding authority that controls this court’s formulation of the law.”53 With respect
to the Dyers’ negligence claim, the trial court found that the USBM guidelines
were sufficient as a basis for identifying a standard of care and that the “record
includes evidence that six of the blasts that Maine Drilling conducted exceeded
[those] guidelines.”54 However, the trial court found that there was no triable issue
regarding causation, reasoning that because there was no evidence as to the actual
nature of the fill under the house, Peterson could only speculate as to how blasting
would affect the home in relation to the fill.55 The trial court also maintained that
summary judgment for Maine Drilling was warranted because “the record does not
include an expert opinion that the blasting conducted by Maine Drilling was a legal
cause of cracking in the house.”56 Shortly thereafter, the Dyers filed an appeal to
the Law Court.
B. Arguments to the Law Court
On appeal, the Dyers argued that the Law Court should overrule the Reynolds
line of cases and “hold that actors who conduct abnormally dangerous activities,
like Defendant’s blasting in this case, are subject to strict liability.”57 The Dyers
observed that even though the issue of strict liability was not raised in Maravell,
the court had characterized blasting in that case as “an inherently dangerous

48. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 984 A.2d at 213-14.
49. “According to Peterson, engineered fill refers to subgrade under a structure’s foundation that is
layered, compacted, or placed in a way so as ‘to avoid deformation after it was placed[,]’” whereas
uncontrolled fill “is ‘fill that’s from an unknown source and of unknown characteristic and placed in an
unknown way.’” Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 9 n.2, 984 A.2d at 213 (citation to footnote only).
50. Id. ¶ 9, 984 A.2d at 213.
51. Id. ¶ 12, 984 A.2d at 214.
52. Id. ¶ 13, 984 A.2d at 214.
53. Dyer v. Me. Drilling and Blasting, Inc., No. CV-07-11, 2009 WL 558278 (Me. Super. Feb. 3,
2009).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Brief of Appellants at 6, Dyer v. Me. Drilling and Blasting, Inc., 2009 ME 126, 984 A.2d 210
(No. WAL-09-116) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants].
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activity.”58 Accordingly, they argued that “Maine law relative to the application of
strict liability to blasting is antiquated and obsolete” and that the court “should join
the vast majority of jurisdictions who have adopted the Restatement view relative
to blasting.”59
Additionally, the Dyers contended that the trial court committed legal error
when it found there was no triable issue as to causation.60 They argued that the
court had failed to consider the six blasts that exceeded the USBM guidelines; an
error that was particularly significant given that the court had focused on those
guidelines as a basis for identifying a standard of care.61 The Dyers also
emphasized that they had observed noticeable changes in the condition of the home
after the blasting took place, and that under Maine law expert testimony was not
required to establish legal causation in a blasting case.62
In response, Maine Drilling asserted that the trial court was correct in holding
that the Reynolds, Cratty, and Albison line of cases were controlling and that strict
liability did not apply to blasting under Maine law.63 Maine Drilling acknowledged
that the Maravell court had characterized blasting as “inherently dangerous,” but
argued that precautionary steps and safety procedures could be employed to
“substantially eliminate the danger,” whereas similar measures could not be
utilized to eliminate the risk of more serious harms arising from abnormally
dangerous activities.64 Moreover, Maine Drilling claimed that pursuant to the
principle of stare decisis, the court should only depart from established precedent
under “the most extraordinary circumstances” and that the Dyers had not pointed to
any “changed conditions so as to justify a departure” from the negligence
standard.65
Furthermore, Maine Drilling contended that the grant of summary judgment on
the issue of causation had been proper because Peterson “admitted the cause of the
alleged damages are ‘unknown,’ ‘speculative,’ and he had no opinion as to
causation.”66 Maine Drilling also maintained that the Dyers did not establish a time
relationship between the blasting and the discovery of the alleged damage to the
home and that prior to the blasting, the Dyer home “had cracks in the floor and
protruding from the chimney.”67
C. Decision of the Law Court
Justice Silver, writing for a majority of the Law Court, adopted the Second
Restatement’s application of strict liability to abnormally dangerous activities and

58. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 8.
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id. at 12.
62. Id. at 17-18.
63. Brief of Appellee at 8, Dyer v. Me. Drilling and Blasting, Inc., 2009 ME 126, 984 A.2d 210
(No. WAL-09-116) [hereinafter Brief of Appellee].
64. Id. at 11.
65. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 2.
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expressly overruled Reynolds and its progeny.68 The court then remanded the case
to the trial court “to determine if the blasting . . . was an abnormally dangerous
activity under the Restatement’s six-factor test.”69 The court explained that the
rationales for not adopting strict liability in Reynolds had been undermined in the
last half-century, particularly by a nationwide shift in policy approaches that had
lead “almost every other state to adopt strict liability in blasting and abnormally
dangerous activity cases.”70 Moreover, the court noted that blasting is “inherently
dangerous” and argued that “most courts have recognized that this inherent danger
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of care.”71 In support of this assertion, the
court demonstrated that “[t]he Dyers’ expert testified that blasting may cause
damage even when it is within the [USBM] guidelines.”72 The court further
justified imposing strict liability by contending that “although blasting is a lawful
and often beneficial activity, the costs should fall on those who benefit from the
blasting, rather than on an unfortunate neighbor.”73 The court reasoned that
because blasters are required to carry liability insurance by many town ordinances
and by the rules of the Maine Department of Public Safety, “a strict liability
scheme should not greatly increase costs for these businesses.”74
On the issue of causation, the court found that the Dyers had produced
sufficient evidence to defeat Maine Drilling’s summary judgment motion.75 The
majority pointed out that six of the blasts had exceeded the USBM guidelines and
concluded that a fact-finder could infer that the changes observed by the Dyers
“over a short period of time[,] in a home over seventy-years-old, were not likely to
be caused” by natural processes.76 The court also explained that Cratty had held
expert testimony was not required “to prove negligence, including causation, in a
blasting case.”77
D. The Dissents
Justice Alexander, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Saufley, argued that
there was no need to overrule Reynolds and establish a new common law rule of
strict liability in blasting cases because the Dyers could recover damages by
showing causation under the existing negligence standard.78 The dissent noted that
“[s]tare decisis helps to assure that an appellate judge’s view that a prior decision
may have been wrongly decided is, standing alone, insufficient to justify overruling
the decision.”79 Furthermore, the dissent maintained that adherence to viable
precedent provides consistency in the law and that past decisions should only be
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 15, 984 A.2d at 215.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18, 984 A.2d at 216.
Id. ¶ 19, 984 A.2d at 216.
Id.
Id.
Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 20, 984 A.2d at 216.
Id. ¶ 33, 984 A.2d at 219-20.
Id. ¶¶ 34-35, 984 A.2d at 220.
Id. ¶ 35, 984 A.2d at 220 (citation omitted).
Id. ¶ 41, 984 A.2d at 221 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 46, 984 A.2d at 222 (citing Alexandre v. State, 2007 ME 106, ¶ 35, 927 A.2d 1155, 1164).
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overruled “after careful analysis and based on a compelling reason.”80 In
demonstrating that there was no need to supplant Maine’s negligence standard with
a strict liability approach to blasting cases, Justice Alexander explained:
Here the trial court has already determined that there is sufficient evidence to
avoid summary judgment on the standard of care and breach of the standard of
care issues. Thus, the only dispute for resolution on this appeal is whether there
remain disputed facts relating to the issue of causation. The Court holds, and I
agree, that the Dyers have produced sufficient evidence to survive Maine
Drilling’s motion for summary judgment on the causation issue incident to their
negligence claim. Thus, based on the Court’s reasoning, and with the trial court
having found fact disputes regarding the standard of care and breach of the
81
standard of care, the Dyers’ negligence claim may proceed to trial.

The dissent also recognized that Cratty was factually on point with the Dyers’
situation and that it provided proper guidance on the issues of negligence and
causation in blasting cases. As a result, Justice Alexander concluded by stating that
the court “should leave resolution of this claim to the trial court, based on our
existing body of law,”82 and furthermore, “should leave it to the Legislature, as a
matter of policy, to determine whether or not to adopt an expanded rule of strict
liability for all cases of damage caused by blasting.”83
Chief Justice Saufley also issued a dissent and initially observed that under
strict liability financial damages are imposed without any proof of fault or
wrongdoing.84 Recognizing that for the last half-century Maine businesses and
insurers have had the expectancy that blasters will only be held liable for their
negligence, the dissent maintained that the majority’s “expansion of fiscal
responsibility to cases where there has been no wrongdoing changes a longestablished financial business equation.”85 The dissent also criticized the majority
for expanding liability “without any factual demonstration of the need for such
change or the potential effect on Maine’s economy”86 and concluded by stating that
“[a]s a matter of jurisprudential policy, this is the wrong approach at the wrong
time.”87
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Questionable Rationales
The majority invoked two familiar rationales for imposing strict liability in
Dyer: (1) that the risk of harm from blasting could not be eliminated by the
exercise of reasonable care;88 and (2) that the economic loss should fall on the party

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶¶ 45-46, 984 A.2d at 222.
Id. ¶ 49, 984 A.2d at 222 (Alexander, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. ¶ 54, 984 A.2d at 224.
Id. ¶ 53, 984 A.2d at 224.
Id. ¶ 56, 984 A.2d at 224 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 57, 984 A.2d at 224.
Id. ¶ 58, 984 A.2d at 224.
Id. ¶ 19, 984 A.2d at 216 (majority opinion).
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benefiting from the dangerous activity.89 Justice Alexander’s dissent demonstrated
that the first rationale could not be used to justify strict liability based on the facts
presented in Dyer90 and Chief Justice Saufley’s dissent questioned the wisdom of
imposing strict liability’s cost-spreading scheme on Maine businesses.91
1. Maine’s Negligence Standard Was Viable and Equitable in Dyer
The majority explained that most courts have found that the danger inherent in
blasting “cannot be eliminated by the exercise of care” and then reasoned that strict
liability should be applied in this case because “[t]he Dyers’ expert testified that
blasting may cause damage even when it is within the [USBM] guidelines.”92
However, Justice Alexander’s dissent convincingly maintained that there was no
need to impose strict liability in this case because the Dyers could recover under
Maine’s negligence standard. As the dissent pointed out, the facts in Dyer were
very similar to those presented in Cratty, where the plaintiff noticed cracking in his
basement floor after blasting took place within 200 feet of his home.93 The Law
Court held in Cratty that a lack of evidence regarding the amount of explosives
used or the blasting methods employed by the defendant did not prevent Cratty’s
claim from proceeding to trial because negligence could be proven “by any
evidence that is relevant and material, although it may be circumstantial.”94 The
dissent observed that in this case, the blasting occurred within 100 feet of the
Dyers’ home and that, unlike in Cratty, a potential standard of care existed in the
form of the USBM guidelines with evidence that that standard was breached on at
least six occasions.95
Despite the fact that the majority disagreed with the trial court and found that
the Dyers had produced evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on the
issue of causation,96 the majority reached out to address the strict liability issue
even though the case could have simply been remanded back to the trial court for
further exploration of the negligence claim. Although the majority argued it could
address the strict liability issue,97 it never articulated why it was necessary to
address that issue in this case. The trial court’s analysis of the negligence claim
ended when it determined that there was no triable issue as to causation.98 As a
result, the majority’s analysis should have ended when it found that the Dyers had
indeed produced evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on that issue.99
Furthermore, in ruling on Maine Drilling’s motion for summary judgment, the
trial court found that “if this is a case where the Dyers would be required to present
evidence of a standard of care, the evidence includes a basis on which the Dyers
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. ¶ 49, 984 A.2d at 222 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶¶ 56-57, 984 A.2d at 224 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting).
Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 19, 984 A.2d at 216 (majority opinion).
Id. ¶¶ 43-44, 984 A.2d at 221-22 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
Cratty, 151 Me. at 131, 116 A.2d at 626.
Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 44, 984 A.2d at 221-22 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 37, 984 A.2d at 220 (majority opinion).
Id. ¶ 15, 984 A.2d at 215.
Id. ¶ 13, 984 A.2d at 214.
Id. ¶ 37, 984 A.2d at 220.
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can argue that Maine Drilling breached the applicable standard and duty of
care.”100 This demonstrates that the applicable standard of care issue was still in
question, but that the evidence in the record would be sufficient to survive a motion
for summary judgment on that issue. Thus, the USBM guidelines only served as a
potential standard of care against which Maine Drilling’s actions could be
measured. Despite this reality, the majority proceeded to justify the adoption of a
“no fault” rule of liability based on one expert’s speculation that this potential
standard of care may be inadequate under a particular set of circumstances to
prevent some unspecified type of damage. Interestingly, in finding that there was a
triable issue as to causation, the majority pointed to the six blasts that exceeded the
USBM guidelines as evidence that would allow a fact-finder to infer that Maine
Drilling had caused damage to the home.101 This position seems to be inconsistent:
denying that the risk of harm can be eliminated with the exercise of due care and
than finding that damage occurred because due care was not properly exercised.
2. Was the Cost-Spreading Approach Justifiable or Prudent?
Cost-spreading can be viewed as an economic rationale or as a fairness
rationale.102 As the majority explained, “strict liability seeks to encourage . . . costspreading”103 and that “although blasting is a lawful and often beneficial activity,
the costs should fall on those who benefit from the blasting, rather than on an
unfortunate neighbor.”104 Even so, given the fact that it was very likely the Dyers
could recover under a negligence theory on remand, the majority failed to explain
how the “costs” of Maine Drillings’ blasting activities were likely to fall on the
“unfortunate” Dyers in this case. The majority further reasoned that because
blasters are required to carry liability insurance in many circumstances, “a strict
liability scheme should not greatly increase costs for these businesses.”105
However, no empirical evidence was ever provided in the opinion to support this
assumption; nor did the majority seem to be troubled by the fact that cost-spreading
has increasingly drawn criticism as being “open-ended” and “highly expansive” in
its allocation of tort liability.106
Accordingly, Chief Justice Saufley was correct to be concerned in her dissent
that the majority had “exercised its authority to expand liability without any factual
demonstration of the need for such change or the potential effect on Maine’s
economy.”107 In fact, several issues that were never addressed by the majority are
raised in the Restatement (Third) of Torts’s rejection of the cost-spreading rationale
as a justification for applying strict liability to abnormally dangerous activities:
The appeal of strict liability . . . does not depend on any notion that the defendant

100. Dyer v. Me. Drilling & Blasting, Inc., No. CV-07-11, 2009 WL 558278 (Me. Super. Feb. 3,
2009) (emphasis added).
101. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 37, 984 A.2d at 220.
102. Simons, supra note 11, at 1373.
103. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 20, 984 A.2d at 216.
104. Id. ¶ 19, 984 A.2d at 216.
105. Id. ¶ 20, 984 A.2d at 216.
106. Simons, supra note 11, at 1374.
107. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 57, 984 A.2d at 224 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting).
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is in a better position than the plaintiff to allocate or distribute the risk of harm:
indeed, the defendant may be a small business enterprise; the property damage
suffered by the plaintiff may be no more than moderate, and the plaintiff as a
108
property owner may already be insured for the loss that that damage entails.

Moreover, Chief Justice Saufley drew attention to the fact that the majority’s
shift in policy from holding blasters liable when they are negligent, or at fault, to
“[t]he expansion of fiscal responsibility to cases where there has been no
wrongdoing changes a long-established financial business equation” because for
over half-a-century “it has been the settled expectation of [Maine] businesses and
insurers that blasters . . . will be held responsible if they are negligent.”109
Although the majority maintained that it is the proper role of the court to
continually shape and define the scope of liability for blasters,110 the Law Court has
previously held and reaffirmed the principle that long-established policy
approaches should only be changed “when [the policy] operates erratically and
produces undesirable results in frequently recurring kinds of situations.”111 Given
the fact that in Reynolds, Albison, Cratty, Maravell, and, as argued above, Dyer, the
plaintiffs’ cases were able to proceed past summary judgment under Maine’s
negligence standard, the majority failed to demonstrate how the existing liability
standards in blasting cases had been operating “erratically” or how they had been
producing “undesirable results.” Thus, even though the majority articulated a
familiar rationale for imposing strict liability on blasting, it failed to provide a
compelling reason for why it was necessary to address the strict liability issue in
Dyer. Above all, the issues raised by the dissents are of particular relevance now
that the Law Court has opened the door to future litigation concerning what
activities should be considered abnormally dangerous under Maine law.
B. The Application of Section 520’s Six-Factor Test to Future Cases
The Law Court’s holding in Dyer did not expressly impose strict liability on
blasting: “We adopt today the Second Restatement’s imposition of strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities, and remand to the court to determine if the
blasting in this case was an abnormally dangerous activity under the Restatement’s
six-factor test.”112 Given this pronouncement, strict liability can now be applied to
any situation where a court finds that an activity meets the Restatement’s six-factor
test. Inevitably, the Law Court will be compelled in future cases to decide whether
a given activity is abnormally dangerous and therefore warrants the application of
strict liability under the Second Restatement. In doing so, the court should
recognize that that issue should be determined as a matter of law. The court should
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20, cmt. e. (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005); but see Simons, supra note 11, at 1374 (questioning the rejection of the costspreading approach).
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 27, 984 A.2d at 218 (majority opinion).
111. Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 992 (Me. 1982) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see
also Bourgeois v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 1999 ME 10, ¶5, 722 A.2d 369, 371 (“We do not disturb a
settled point of law unless the prevailing precedent lacks vitality and the capacity to serve the interests
of justice.”) (citing Myrick, 444 A.2d at 1000)).
112. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 15, 984 A.2d at 215.
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also be aware that most courts have found that factor (c)—whether the risk of harm
can be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care—controls the legal analysis
and the legal conclusion in cases applying section 520’s six-factor test.113
1. Whether an Activity is an Abnormally Dangerous One is a Question of Law
After adopting strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, the Dyer
court remanded the case to the trial court “to determine if blasting in this case was
an abnormally dangerous activity under the Restatement’s six-factor test.”114
However, the court did not clearly state whether the trial court should make this
determination as a matter of law or whether resolution of the issue should be left to
the jury.115 Comment L to section 520 of the Second Restatement directs courts to
decide this issue as a matter of law and explains how the determination of this issue
differs from questions arising under a negligence standard:
The standard of the hypothetical reasonable man is essentially a jury standard, in
which the court interferes only in the clearest cases. A jury is fully competent to
decide whether the defendant has properly driven his horse or operated his train or
guarded his machinery or repaired his premises, or dug a hole. The imposition of
strict liability, on the other hand, involves a characterization of the defendant's
activity or enterprise itself, and a decision as to whether he is free to conduct it at
all without becoming subject to liability for the harm that ensues even though he
has used all reasonable care. This calls for a decision of the court; and it is no part
of the province of the jury to decide whether an industrial enterprise upon which
the community's prosperity might depend is located in the wrong place or whether
such an activity as blasting is to be permitted without liability in the center of a
116
large city.

As the comment demonstrates, the reasonable person standard is used in
negligence cases to determine whether a defendant’s actions fall within acceptable
community norms of conduct. Alternatively, the decision to apply strict liability to
certain activities is a policy determination best left to a court’s discretion rather
than a jury’s. A number of appellate courts have embraced this position and have
held that whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, and therefore warrants the
imposition of strict liability, is an issue that should be decided as a matter of law.117
2. The Six-Factor Test Ultimately Asks Whether the Situation Can be
Resolved Under a Negligence Standard
In applying the Second Restatement’s six-factor test to determine if an activity
is abnormally dangerous, a number of courts have found that the “crux of the
liability issue” turns on whether the risk of harm can be eliminated by the exercise

113. Boston, supra note 12, at 631.
114. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 15, 984 A.2d at 215.
115. Id.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, cmt. l (1977).
117. See Boston, supra note 12, at 630 (“Virtually all courts and both Restatements have taken the
position that whether an activity qualifies as ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous is a question of
law for the court.”).
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of due care.118 For example, in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad v. American
Cyanamid Co.,119 Judge Richard Posner explained that “[t]he baseline common law
regime of tort liability is negligence”120 and that when “the hazards of an activity
can be avoided by being careful (which is to say, nonnegligent), there is no need to
switch to strict liability.”121 In that case, Cyanamid, a manufacturer of the
hazardous chemical acrylonitrile, had been held strictly liable by the trial court
when a railroad tank car containing 20,000 gallons of the chemical spilled.122 In
reversing the trial court’s holding that shipping acrylonitrile through a metropolitan
area was an abnormally dangerous activity under section 520, Judge Posner noted
that the court had “been given no reason . . . for believing that a negligence regime
is not perfectly adequate to remedy and deter, at reasonable cost, the accidental
spillage of acrylonitrile from rail cars.”123 He went on to conclude that based on all
the available information “if a tank car is carefully maintained the danger of a spill
of acrylonitrile is negligible. If this is right, there is no compelling reason to move
to a regime of strict liability.”124
Similarly, in Bagley v. Controlled Environmental Corp.,125 former United
States Supreme Court Justice David Souter, writing for the majority as a member of
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, explained that the court would “decline to
impose strict liability in the absence of any demonstration that the requirement to
prove legal fault acts as a practical barrier to otherwise meritorious claims.”126 In
that case, it was argued that Environmental Corp. should be held strictly liable
under section 520 for the contamination of the plaintiff’s soil and ground water,
which had been caused by the release of gasoline and waste materials into a
neighboring property.127 The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the strict
liability claim and observed that “[w]ith respect to the dumping of the waste
products and the leakage of gasoline in this case, there is no apparent impossibility
of proving negligence.”128 In support of this position, he noted that “the facts
pleaded in this case present no problems of identifying the person who may have
breached a duty, or of tracing causation for harm to one among several defendants,
each of whom breached a duty.”129
This reluctance to abandon the negligence standard may also be attributable, in
part, to the reality that legislatures, rather than appellate courts, are in a better
position to gather information on certain dangerous activities and to weigh policy
arguments both for and against the imposition of strict liability on those
activities.130
118.
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C. Strict Liability Issues Are More Readily Addressed by the Legislature
Increasingly, the Maine Legislature has taken on the role of applying strict
liability, as a matter of policy, in a number of instances, including natural gas
explosions,131 injuries from defective products,132 and for hazardous waste and oil
spills.133 Prior to the Law Court’s decision in Dyer the application of common law
strict liability in Maine had been limited to damages caused by wild animals134 and
owners of domestic animals in certain situations.135 Although blasting is regarded
as a “paradigm of the abnormally dangerous activities category” under the theory
of strict liability,136 the Law Court may find it much more difficult in future cases
to apply the Restatement’s six-factor test to other activities. As Professor Gerald
Boston noted in his study of cases where section 520 was applied, courts have been
forced to rely on “extra-judicial data . . . in arriving at the ultimate legal
conclusion”137 because, for example, “[t]he decision of whether an activity is a
matter of common usage or whether it is being conducted at a suitable place turns
not so much on adjudicative facts, but more on legislative or policy judgments.”138
Professor Boston went on to explain that this is why “one court can conclude that
blasting is locationally suitable in one case, while most courts historically have
found otherwise.”139 In order to avoid similarly erratic results, the Law Court
should adhere to Justice Alexander’s admonition that “[the court] should leave it to
the Legislature, as a matter of policy, to determine whether or not to adopt an
expanded rule of strict liability.”140 The Law Court should also recognize that the
Legislature is in a far better position to assess the financial and economic impacts
of strict liability schemes on Maine businesses and insurers.
V. CONCLUSION
In Dyer, the Law Court adopted the Second Restatement’s application of strict
liability to activities that are found to be abnormally dangerous.141 The majority
justified this decision by asserting that the risk of harm from blasting cannot be
eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care142 and that notions of fairness
associated with cost-spreading also served as justifications for imposing strict
liability on blasters.143 However, Justice Alexander’s dissent convincingly
maintained that because there was sufficient evidence in the record for the Dyers to
recover under a negligence theory, there was no need to impose strict liability,144
131.
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134.
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136.
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138.
139.
140.
141.
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144.

14 M.R.S.A. § 165 (2003).
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and Chief Justice Saufley’s dissent provided valid criticism of the majority’s
expansion of liability to cases where blasters have not engaged in any wrongdoing
without providing a compelling reason for doing so.145
Only a small number of activities have been found to be abnormally dangerous
and deserving of strict liability under the Second Restatement.146 The Law Court,
in future cases, should continue this narrow application of strict liability. This can
be achieved in large part by heeding the concerns voiced by the dissents in Dyer
and by continuing to adhere to the principle that settled points of law will not be
disturbed “unless ‘the prevailing precedent lacks vitality and the capacity to serve
the interests of justice.’”147

145. Id. ¶ 56, 984 A.2d at 224 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting).
146. See generally Boston, supra note 12.
147. See Bourgeois, 1999 ME 10, ¶ 5, 722 A.2d at 371 (quoting Myrick, 444 A.2d at 1000).

